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DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN
ANTITRUST LAW
DR. KURT E. lfARKERT**
T HE paper' which I have prepared for this conference deals with a
broader range of topics than I will address here. I will not discuss
the role of competition in German economic and political life,2 nor the
development of antitrust in Germany and the various practices that
are covered now as a result of the 1957 law and two amendments since
the law was passed. 3 In order to make a useful contribution I think I
should perhaps underline a few aspects that are covered in my paper
against the background of United States antitrust law.
First of all, a few remarks with regard to horizontal restraints of
competition which we generally call cartels. 4 German antitrust law is
very similar to United States antitrust law in that illegal cartels can be
criminally prosecuted. There are no jail sentences under German law,
but as may be seen in the examples I have given in the Appendix,5 the
fines are considerably higher than those imposed under United States
antitrust law. In the biggest case so far, the fine imposed against
several firms and several managers totaled 50 million DM. There will
be an out-of-court settlement in a very short time, so the fine %%ill be
somewhat reduced, but it will still be over ten million DM. 6 I am not
sure if a fine of that size can be imposed under American antitrust law.
* The articles published in this issue of the Review were delivered at the Fordham Corporate
Law Institute held Nov. 12-13, 1974, in New York City. The complete proceedings of the
Institute will appear in 1974 Fordham Corporate Law Institute-nternational Antilrust (B.
Hawk ed.), (c) Matthew Bender & Co. 1975. The articles herein are published with permission of
the Fordhan Corporate Law Institute. Copyright held by Matthew Bender & Co.
** Chairman of the 7th Decision Tribunal of the German Federal Cartel Office. M.C.J.
New York University, 1959; Dr. jur., University of Wurzburg, 1961.
1. See Appendix.
2. See Appendix, Part I. This subject is included in order to provide a general background of
the climate in which antitrust in Germany has to be viewed today.
3. See Appendix, Part II.
4. See generally H. Kronstein, The Law of International Cartels 154-97 (1973).
5. See Appendix, Part IIIA.
6. Approximately four million dollars.
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Turning to the differences between the two laws, in Germany there
are no strict per se rules as there are in the United States. This can be
seen in a number of German exemption clauses, 7 whereunder particu-
lar cartels can be exempted from the general ban. The granting of an
exemption depends, first of all, on the degree of restraint of competi-
tion effected by the cartel. Here two aspects have to be distinguished.
The first aspect is whether the agreement excludes competition be-
tween the parties entirely, or only with respect to particular items such
as terms of sales, discounts, et cetera. The second aspect is whether
and to what extent there are outsiders competing with the cartel,
which would guarantee the functioning of competition in the market.
In this respect, the market share of the cartel members plays a decisive
role-the higher the market share of the cartel the less likelihood there
is that an exemption will be granted.
In addition to the competition question-the question as to what
degree competition is restrained by the cartel-the other important
factor is whether the anti-competitive effects can be or are in fact
outweighed by positive effects of some other kind, such as cost
reductions that are passed on to the consumer.
Without going into detail, I think one can say after more than fifteen
years of practical application of the system that it is not easy to get an
exemption. The more power the cartel members have in the market
and the less it can be demonstrated that the cartel has some beneficial
effects (the members of the cartel have the burden of proof on this
issue) the more difficult it becomes to secure an exemption. The main
idea behind this system today is to help smaller firms combine among
themselves in order to compete more effectively with the larger firms.
We have seen in a number of cases that this is a better choice to
make than just letting the small firms be swallowed by the big firms.
Of course, there are a number of controversial questions involved in
this concept, but I think basically there is something positive to it from
a competitive point of view.
Finally, as to horizontal restraints, I should mention that private
enforcement, contrary to American practice, does not play a very
important role in Germany. There are a number of explanations for
this. I will just mention two. First of all, there is no treble damage
clause in our law. This is not a familiar concept in German law in
general, so it has not been put into the antitrust law. Secondly, and
this is of course of more interest to the legal community, lawyers are
prohibited under German law from working on a contingent fee basis.
7. See Appendix, Part II. Certain American statutes do provide express immunity or
exemption from the antitrust laws for certain regulated industries. See, e.g., Federal Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c)(1) (1970); Federal Maritime Act, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
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These factors explain, I think, why many private antitrust suits that
could be brought in Germany (in the Appendix, I have indicated that
we have a number of conspiracy cases)8 are never even instituted.
With regard to vertical restraints of trade, with the exception of
resale price maintenance, German law is somewhat less strict than
United States law. Resale price maintenance was prohibited last year
except for books, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, and the like.9 In
addition, and I think thfs is something unknown in United States
antitrust law, we have relatively strict controls on the practice of
suggesting retail prices. We have in recent months prohibited quite a
number of retail price systems because we thought that they either
enhanced prices or were deceptive to the consumer. 10
As to exclusive dealing agreements, territorial and customer restric-
tions and tie-ins, 11 the law enforcement in recent years has not been
very active. But in evaluating the record, I think one has to bear in
mind that EEC antitrust law resolves these problems if interstate trade
within the Common Market is involved;' 2 and the result has been that
if you cannot consummate a particular kind of restrictive agreement on
a Common Market basis, neither can you effect it on a national level.
In other words, if the Commission eliminates territorial restrictions in
trade between the various member countries of the Common ,Market
(which it has done quite frequently) then this is also the end of
territorial restrictions in Germany. Therefore, we have not felt it
necessary to give too much care to that particular field of restrictive
practices.
In the area of patent and know-how licensing,' 3 the same situation
appears. Again, there is a relatively liberal practice under the German
antitrust law. But as with exclusive dealing arrangements, EEC law
comes into play and the trend, though presently not quite as developed
as the territorial restrictions and similar restrictions, appears to be
moving toward the same result. Within the past year the Commission
8. See Appendix, Part IIIA.
9. See Heil & Vorbrugg, Anti-Trust Law in West Germany- Recent Developments in German
and Common Market Regulation, 8 Int'l Law. 349, 355-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Heil &
Vorbrugg].
10. See Appendix, Part IVB.
11. See Hell & Vorbrugg 351-54.
12. See generally P. Kapteyn & P. Van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities 249-67 (1973); K. Lipstein, The Law of the European Economic Community
188-242 (1974); C. Oberdorfer, A. Gleiss & M. Hirsch, Common Market Cartel Law (1971);
Note, Common Market Antitrust Law: Jurisdiction: Limitations Imposed by Article 85(0) of the
Treaty of Rome, 6 Cornell Int'l L.J. 163 (1973).
13. See H. Kronstein, The Law of International Cartels 61-64 (1973); Schapiro, The German
Law Against Restraints of Competition-Comparative and International Aspects, 62 Colum. L.
Rev. 201, 219-36 (1962).
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has increased its efforts to deal with restrictions and know-how
licensing and results can be expected within the near future.
The conduct control of dominant firms14 is a subject discussed at
length in the Appendix' s since it is entirely unknown in American
antitrust law. The general approach which we have taken in Germany
is not a structural approach toward monopoly power, but rather a
conduct approach. In other words, German law, apart from merger
control, accepts monopolistic positions but submits them to a system of
conduct control. The term that is relevant in this context-that is, the
criterion on which the control is based-is the concept of abusive
exploitation of a market dominating position.
Of course, when one uses the terms "market," and "market dominat-
ing position," difficult problems come up-for example, what is the
relevant market? And, as a matter of fact, as can be seen from the
pharmaceuticals cases that are mentioned in the Appendix, this is one
of the central issues of the cases.
How dominance is defined in our law is discussed in the details in
the Appendix. We have, and this is perhaps worth mentioning here, in
addition to substantive criteria, market share presumptions. If a firm
reaches a certain market share, it is presumed to have a market
dominating position. And what is more important, the law on domi-
nant positions also covers shared monopoly power. So if several firms
together as a group, even though there is no agreement between them,
have a dominant position on the market, each of the firms is subject to
the abuse control under section 22 of our law. 16 Thus, for example,
if two or three firms together have a market share of 50 percent or
more, or four or five firms have a two-thirds share of the market, they
are presumed to be market dominating. In the Appendix,' 7 I have
indicated how the system is applied in practice in the light of recent
cases. We have had some business with the oil industry. The Federal
Cartel Office as a matter of fact lost the only court cases that came up
in this field. But this was only on the preliminary question of whether
the order that was made should be given immediate effect. The court
in this case did not really go into the entire problem of abusive
exploitation of a market dominating position. But, since the oil case,
we have issued two orders against two different drug manufacturers,
and they have also brought appeals. It can be expected that the courts
in these two cases will be forced to really test the concept that was
14. See Heil & Vorbrugg 362-73.
15. See Appendix, Part IV.
16. See Act Against Restraints of Competition § 22. An English translation of the German
antitrust law from 1957 to 1972 may be found in 2 OECD, Guide to Legislation on Restrictive
Business Practices (1973). For a translation of § 22, see id. at 15.
17. See Appendix, Part IVB.
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developed by the Federal Cartel Office on the basis of some Supreme
Court judgments that were not exactly to the point, but in our view
developed the same general principles. The more important of these
two direct cases is the Hoffinan-LaRoche case. It is expected that the
court hearing on the appeal will take place in the near future.
Now, very briefly within my time limit, a few words on merger
control.' 8 We did not have any merger control until an amendment
last year. The new control system which was introduced by the
amendment of 197319 has essentially the following features. There is a
compulsory notification system, under which purchase mergers of a
certain dimension have to be notified. As a rule, notification is
required only after the consummation of a merger. But large mergers,
defined as mergers in which at least two firms with one billion DM
(approximately $400 million) in annual sales are involved, have to be
notified in advance and can only be put into effect after clearance has
been given or certain time limits have elapsed without a reaction by
the Federal Cartel Office.
The duty to notify and the control powers of the Federal Cartel
Office to intervene also depend on whether the merger reaches certain
size and market dimensions. Incidentally, in the 1974 spring issue of
the Antitrust Bulletin there is an article of mine which describes the
whole system in detail. 20 I am just mentioning here that not every
anti-competitive merger is covered by the law; rather there must be a
certain minimum dimension in terms of aggregate annual sales. The
annual sales of the firms involved must together be at least 500 million
DM (approximately $200 million), and also the merger must not be of
a purely local character.
The other feature is that the merger control is divided into two
stages, and this leads back to what I said at the beginning with regard
to horizontal restraints. The first stage deals with the anti-competitive
effects of the merger and this stage is handled by the Federal Cartel
Office. In other words, the Federal Cartel Office has to investigate the
competitive situation in connection with the merger, and if it finds that
the merger is anti-competitive according to the definitions of the law
(i.e., if the merger creates or strengthens a market dominating posi-
tion), it is required to prohibit the merger. And only then, if such a
prohibition case has been made, can the parties apply to the
Economics Minister for an exemption.
As can be seen from one of the cases, a case involving a merger of
two German oil companies, such an exemption has been given. For
18. See Heil & Vorbrugg 372-78.
19. Second Act Amending the Act against Restraints of Competition, Law of Aug. 3, 1973
[1973] BGBI. I 917.
20. Markert, The New German Antitrust Reform Law, 19 Antitrust Bull. 135 (1974).
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reasons that I have stated in the Appendix, I have not identified myself
with this position.
I have also set forth in the Appendix 2I a few figures concerning the
number of cases that arose during the period of more than a year that
the system has been in operation. We have had about 120 cases so far.
Of these 120 cases that have been examined, three prohibitions were
made. But these three prohibitions do not tell the whole story. There
are a number of other cases where in preliminary talks with the
parties, we persuaded them that it was not worthwhile to continue
with the merger because they would have to face a prohibition order. I
am also told that there are a number of other cases, where perhaps
without even approaching the Federal Cartel Office, merger plans
were changed because of antitrust considerations. So as a whole, I
would say the system has been working quite effectively during the
first year of its application.
In the Appendix I also deal with export cartels. 22 I cannot go into
detail, but in concluding I would just like to answer one of the
questions that was raised by Mr. Timberg. He asked whether a
Webb-Pomerene export cartel that covers exports to Germany can be
prosecuted under German law. The answer is clearly yes. I remember
working on a case against the American Films export cartel. We did
not bring the case ultimately, but only because we thought that at that
time the cartel did not act in violation of German law; thus this was
not a matter of principle, but rather a matter of the facts of the
particular case.
But we have had a number of other cases where we acted against
foreign export cartels. There are several cases involving Japanese
self-restraint arrangements; these cases are at present still pending. We
have also brought a case against the Scandinavian Paper export
cartels. So the principle that you can act against foreign export cartels
to the extent that imports to the country are involved is well estab-
lished.
I am afraid that is all I can say within the limits that I had for this
talk. Thank you very much.
APPENDIX
I. THE ROLE OF COMPETITION
Competition is given a stronger emphasis in Germany than in most
other member countries of the European Economic Community.'
21. See Appendix, Part VB.
22. See Appendix, Part RGIC.
1. Earlier antitrust developments in Germany are described in 3 Business Regulation in the
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Thus, Germany today is the only member country without some sort
of general price and wage controls and without much sympathy for the
various self-restraint schemes for the importation of "low price"
foreign products. Competition is playing a primary role in public and
political life. This is indicated not only by the scope of the antitrust
law and the vigor of its enforcement, but also by the interest of the
public in questions of competition policy. Certainly the situation in
Germany in this respect is not quite comparable with that in the
United States where, as Galbraith once said, antitrust is part of the
domestic folklore. But apart from the United States, Germany is
probably the only country where competition questions are discussed
on a broad basis and where there is an echo in the media to develop-
ments in the field of antitrust law.
It must be said, however, that the role of competition in the German
economic system has changed somewhat during the last ten years.
Only part of this change is due to the political change five years ago
when a coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party
came into power. Before the mid-sixties competition was regarded
almost as a religious phenomenon, and any idea of planning, even in
the form of general projections, was considered a sacrilege. Some legal
scholars at that time had even argued that the "social market
economy" was protected by the federal constitution so that changes
would require a two-thirds majority of both houses of Parliament.
Reflections of this "purist" form of thinking can also be found in the
explanatory memorandum to the government's antitrust bill of 1952-55
where "complete" competition-i.e., the absence of market power of
individual firms-is described as the primary aim of competition policy
and where the socio-political functions of competition as a charter of
economic freedom are strongly emphasized.
This picture has since changed in two respects. First, the idealistic
concept of "complete" competition as the guiding principle of competi-
tion policy has given way to more realistic concepts which are usually
described as workable or effective competition. Secondly, the role of
competition in the entire economic system today is seen more in the
context of general economic development. While competition is still
regarded as the primary steering instrument on the micro-economic
level-i.e., the economic activities of individual producers and con-
sumers of goods and services-governmental measures are regarded as
necessary to ensure general economic stability and growth. This new
approach has been characterized as a combination of neo-liberalism
and Keynesianism. Legally, it has found expression in the Act for the
Common Market Nations (H. Blake ed. 1969); Markert, The New German Antitrust Reform
Law, 19 Antitrust Bull. 135 (1974); Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of
Competition-Comparative and International Aspects, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 201 (1962).
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Promotion of Economic Stability and Growth of June 8, 1967, which
provides for a variety of measures of economic and fiscal policy to
enable a global steering of the general economic development. One of
these measures is the publication of an annual economic report at the
beginning of each year which must contain the so-called "yearly
projection," i.e., an exposition of the government's economic and fiscal
policy aims for the coming year. The law, however, expressly states
that these aims must be realized only "within the framework of the
market economy order."
In addition to global steering, one can observe in Germany today the
same tendency as in most modern industrialized countries, namely,
that the government actively influences the development of certain
economic sectors-a phenomenon which is usually called industrial
policy. While there is at present no general system of sectorial planning
(not even a weak form of indicative planning), the activities of the
government in the field of industrial policy are growing, particularly in
the energy and technology sector. It is quite natural that in this context
conflicting points of view concerning competition policy can arise. In
such cases competition policy considerations are not easily brushed
aside but rather are usually weighed on an equal basis with the other
policy considerations involved.
II. COVERAGE OF ANTITRUST LAW
The 1957 Act Against Restraints of Competition, 2 replacing the
post-war antitrust laws enacted by the occupation powers, was a
compromise between different interest groups within the then govern-
ing Christian Democratic Party. This can best be seen when one
compares the government's bill with the text finally passed. Parlia-
ment, for example, did not accept the government's proposal to control
mergers. Further, it enlarged the list of exemption clauses. What
finally came out as law was essentially:
a general ban on cartels (horizontal restrictive agreements);
a list of exemptions from that ban;
a general ban on vertical restrictive agreements relating to resale prices and resale
terms of sale;
an exemption for resale price maintenance;
an abuse supervision over certain other vertical restrictive agreements, such as
exclusive dealings, other marketing restrictions and tie-in clauses;
a prohibition of certain restrictive clauses in contracts on the transfer or licensing of
patents, registered designs and protected seed varieties, with the possibility to grant
exemptions from that prohibition;
2. Law of July 27, 1957, [19571 BGBL. I 1081. An English translation of the German
antitrust law from 1957 to 1972 may be found in 2 OECD, Guide to Legislation on Restrictive
Business Practices (1973) [hereinafter cited as 2 OECD].
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an abuse supervision over prices and tie-in clauses of market dominating firms;
a duty to register mergers with a market share of 20 percent or more;
a prohibition of certain coercive measures and of unfair hindrance and discrimina-
tion against other firms;
a prohibition of recommendations insofar as they result in a type of conduct that
would be unlawful if brought about by an unlawful restrictive agreement; and,
a list of exemptions of certain economic sectors from either the whole or part of the
provisions of the law, including transportation, agriculture, banking, insurance and
public utilities.
The 1957 law being a political compromise, discussion about its
reform is as old as the law itself. Mainly, two points have remained
consistently controversial: the exemption of resale price maintenance
and the absence of merger control. On the other hand, the business
community has criticized the narrow scope of the exemptions from the
cartel ban as an undue burden on cooperation between independent
firms, particularly the smaller ones. All this led to a new legislative
measure in 1965 when the first amendment to the law was passed.3
Because the general political situation had not changed since 1958,
however, only minor changes were brought about, namely:
a simpler exemption procedure for standardization and specialization of cartels;
the introduction of a public register for resale price maintenance and the introduc-
tion of presumptions to facilitate the abuse supervision over exempted resale price
maintenance systems;
an extension of the abuse supervision over market dominating firms to include the
entire conduct of such firms; and,
an extension of the registration requirements for mergers.
The new law satisfied neither side. Resale price maintenance re-
mained and merger control was still missing. Business claimed that the
scope of cooperation permitted by the law was still too narrow. In
addition, discussion of amending the law was more and more
influenced by the experiences encountered in the application of the
existing law. There were three issues in particular which increasingly
gained momentum. First, the fact that the prohibition of cartels
covered only "contracts" turned out to be a serious gap, particularly
after the Supreme Court decided in 1970 that this term required a
contract under the rules of the Civil Code. After this decision there
was an increasing demand that the law be changed so as to include
concerted actions as in Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Second, the
concept of market domination, defined as absence of effective competi-
tion, proved to be rather impractical. Therefore the introduction of
more practicable criteria, such as a standard based on market share,
3. Act Amending the Act Against Restraints of Competition, Law of July 23, 1965, [1965]
BGBI. I 1363; see 3 Business Regulation in the Common Market Nations 136 (H. Blake ed.
1969).
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was proposed. Finally, the sector exemptions were more and more
regarded as an unjustified privilege.
The second amendment in 19734 not only dealt with most of these
points but also brought about substantial changes. The exempted
sectors question was the only issue not dealt with, but Parliament,
recognizing that changes were necessary, asked the government to
present within a year a report on the situation in these sectors together
with proposals on changes in the existing law. The main changes made
by the 1973 law were:
the abolition of resale price maintenance (except for books) and a stricter supervision
over resale price recommendations;
the introduction of a system to control mergers;
the introduction of more specific criteria for market domination; and,
a wider scope of inter-enterprise cooperation with a view to strengthening the
competitive position of smaller enterprises.
III. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO CARTELS
Cartel agreements are unenforceable and the implementation of such
agreements can be prohibited by administrative orders and prosecuted
by fines. There are, however, exemption clauses for certain types of
cartels. The procedural requirements for an exemption depend upon
the estimated extent of the cartel's effect on competition.
The first category of cartels may gain exemption by mere notifica-
tion; this applies to standardization cartels and export cartels. A
second category of cartels becomes effective (i.e., gains exemptions)
only if the enforcement authority does not object within a period of
three months after notification. During that period they are usually
closely scrutinized. This second category includes cartels on terms of
sale, rebate cartels, specialization cartels, and rationalization cartels
not substantially affecting competition in the market. Finally, a third
group of cartels requires a special authorization decision in each case
to become effective. These are structural crises cartels, rationalization
cartels (to the extent not included in the second group), importation
cartels and cartels which serve the public interest.
A. Prosecution of Illegal Cartels
As of the end of 1974, 2,610 proceedings against illegal cartels had
been initiated. Most of these cases were terminated at a very prelimi-
nary stage either because no violation could be found or because the
incriminating practice had been abandoned. Administrative fines were
4. Second Act Amending the Act Against Restraints of Competition, Law of Aug. 3, 1973,
[1973] BGB1. I 917; see Heil & Vorbrugg, Anti-Trust Law in West Germany: Recent Develop-
ments in German and Common Market Regulation, 8 Int'l Law. 349, 350-51 (1974),
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imposed in thirty-one cases, most of which are fairly recent. Only one
fine was imposed during the first ten years of the act. But in the
following years (1967-1974) more than thirty administrative fines
were imposed (one in 1968, four in 1969, one in 1970, three in 1971,
nine in 1972, three in 1973, and seventeen in 1974). In 1971 the
Federal Cartel Office for the first time made use of its power to impose
fines up to three times the amount of profits made as a result of the
illegal practices. The fine in this case (the Linoleum case) totalled 5,62
million DM but was later reduced by the appellate court to 1,01
million DM. The following is a more detailed description of some
important cases.
In the Man-made Fibers5 case, the Federal Cartel Office found that
all suppliers of man-made fibers in the Federal Republic-except
subsidiaries of American firms and, in some cases, British groups-
had participated in domestic, European and world-wide cartel agree-
ments with a view to restrict competition in markets for staple fiber,
polyamide (perlon and nylon), rayon viscose and acetate. The illegal
practices included: allocation of areas of interest to individual groups
with the result that, for the most part, Japanese fibers did not enter
European markets; agreements between European suppliers on divi-
sions of European markets and on prices; and, aggregate rebates and
methods of distribution in their home markets so as to secure national
spheres of interest. In addition, agreements, primarily price agree-
ments, existed between the manufacturers regarding the domestic
markets. In March 1972 nine German firms were fined a total of about
48 million DM and eighteen directors, sales managers, heads of legal
departments and executives of the firms involved (as well as one
employee of an auditing firm) were fined a total of 410,450 DM. All
orders are still under review before the Berlin Court of Appeals.
6
During its investigation, the Federal Cartel Office had conducted
searches of the premises of most defendants. It had also successfully
applied to the local criminal court for a search warrant and a seizure
order, demanding permission to search the offices of Treuarbeit, an
auditing and trust company, and to seize documents if necessary. On
appeal by that firm, the court of second instance confirmed the order.
On further appeal the Federal Constitutional Court stated that the
right and duty of an auditing company to keep secret all facts
concerning its customers does not preclude a search of its premises
when such a company is itself suspected of participation in an illegal
cartel. 7 This decision is mentioned to emphasize the importance of the
5. Decision of Mar. 15, 1972, (1972) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 525.
6. The case was terminated after the indicated firms agreed to pay a 12 million DM fine.
7. Judgment of Apr. 17, 1973, (1973) Der Betriebsberater 812.
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far-reaching investigatory powers of the Federal Cartel Office. Under
the Administrative Offences Act,8 the Office has the authority of a
public prosecutor and may apply to the competent court for search and
seizure warrants concerning both offices and private homes of sus-
pected persons. Such warrants are issued without prior notice to the
defendants and, if necessary, can be executed with the assistance of
the police.
In the Linoleum9 case two manufacturers of linoleum and felt-base
participated in cartel agreements restricting competition between two
German suppliers of floor coverings for domestic and foreign markets.
Their agreements concerned prices, quotas, rebates and exports. The
Federal Cartel Office for the first time made use of its power to issue
fines up to three times the additional profits obtained as a result of the
violation and imposed fines totalling 5,62 million DM (the amounts
corresponding to one and a half times the additional profits). In a later
decision the Berlin Court of Appeals upheld the conviction with regard
to all alleged offences. The court, however, was not convinced that the
price agreements resulted in additional profits, and it therefore reduced
the fines to 1,01 million DM, based solely on the additional profits
derived from the rebate and quota agreements.' 0 While one of the
defendant firms and two of its managers have appealed to the Federal
Supreme Court, the conviction is final with respect to the other
defendants. I
In a recent decision, the Federal Cartel Office imposed fines against
the Federal Chamber of Physicians, its former president and another
officer, and against the Association of Laboratory Doctors, its vice-
president and another of its officers. 12 The fines totalled 122,500 DM.
The defendants had threatened two firms which had established blood
test laboratories accessible to independent doctors. Both firms-drug
manufacturers-were threatened, inter alia, with boycotts of their
drugs. The case is now pending before the appellate court.
B. Exempted Cartels
From the enactment of the Act Against Restraints of Competition in
1957 through the end of 1974, 448 cartel agreements were notified or
otherwise submitted to the Federal Cartel Office with a view to
obtaining an exemption. Of these agreements, 340 came into effect,
and 227 were still in force as of December 31, 1974. The number of
8. Law of May 24, 1968, (1968] BGBI. I 481.
9. Decision of Dec. 28, 1971, (1972) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 254.
10. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1972, (1973) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 273.
11. The appeal has meanwhile been rejected by the Supreme Court with the exception of one
minor technical point. See Judgment of Sept. 19, 1974, KRB 2/74.
12. Decision of Feb. 14, 1974, (1974) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 576.
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exempted cartels increased until 1970, but since 1971 their number has
been decreasing. It should be mentioned, however, that these numbers
do not indicate the total number of legal cartels in the Federal
Republic since they do not include cartels in the exempted sectors
(transportation, agriculture, banks and insurance companies, and pub-
lic utilities). Statistics on cartels in these sectors are not available. The
largest groups of exempted cartels are export cartels (sixty-eight),
specialization cartels (fifty-four), terms-of-sale agreements (forty-three)
and rebate cartels (thirty-one).
The new exemption clause of section 5(b), 13 permitting cartels which
do not substantially restrict competition in the market and which
promote the efficiency of small and medium-sized firms, has not yet
had much practical relevance. As of the end of 1974, fewer than ten
such cartels had been allowed.
C. Export Cartels
The export cartel exemption (section 6) 14 distinguishes between: (i)
export cartels relating exclusively to exports ("pure" export cartels);
and, (ii) export cartels which entail ancillary restraints on domestic
competition-for example, where domestic export merchants are re-
strained by export cartels of domestic manufacturers in their dealings
with foreign customers ("mixed" export cartels). In both cases the
granting of an exemption requires that the cartel serve "the protection
and promotion of exports," but whereas "pure" export cartels merely
have to be notified, "mixed" export cartels require an express authori-
zation. Section 6 is applied both to national export cartels and to the
participation of national firms in international export cartels. Exemp-
ted export cartels are to be supervised to prevent "abuses."
A detailed analysis of exempted "pure" export cartels as of De-
cember 31, 1970 is contained in the UNCTAD interim report "Restric-
tive Business Practices" of 1971.15 Since then, no major new export
cartels have been added. At the end of 1973 the number of exempted
"pure" export cartels had dropped from seventy-three to sixty-six and
the number of exempted "mixed" export cartels remained at five.
Until a recent judgment of the Federal Supreme Court, 16 the
13. Second Act Amending the Act against Restraints of Competition, Law of Aug. 3, 1973,
[1973] BGBI. I 917 456.
14. 2 OECD 6.
15. U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/1041 Rev. 1, 52, Annex IM. The names of the cartels and of the
participating firms as well as the precise products involved, cannot be disclosed. Such disclosure
is prohibited by existing law. See also K. Markert, Zur Gegenw rtigen Situation der Exportkar-
telle (The Present Export Cartel Situation) AWD 99-107 (1970).
16. Judgment of July 12, 1973, (1973) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 70 (international oil-pipes
cartel).
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Federal Cartel Office took the position that "pure" export cartels
involving German exports were covered by German antitrust laws
regardless of whether such cartels had domestic effects in Germany.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the general rule of section
98(2)-that German antitrust law "shall apply to all restraints of
competition which have the effect within the territory in which it
applies, even if such restraints result from acts done outside"' 7 -is
applicable also to "pure" export cartels. At the same time the Supreme
Court held that a domestic effect, in the sense of this provision,
requires adverse effects on domestic competition.
The precise consequences of this judgment are at present not yet
fully ascertainable. It is hardly possible to demonstrate that the
registered "pure" export cartels have adverse effects on domestic
competition. This would mean that these cartels are no longer within
the reach of German antitrust law. As a result, they would no longer
be notifiable, nor could action against "abuses" be taken. This was
clearly not the legislative intent.
In this context, mention should be made of the critical German
attitude vis-A-vis private self-restraint ("orderly marketing") agree-
ments of Japanese exporters limiting exports to German markets.
Generally, this position was expressed in a letter by the Minister for
Economic Affairs to the President of the Federal Cartel Office, stating
that for economic policy reasons private self-restriction arrangements
limiting imports into the Federal Republic are generally considered
undesirable, and that such arrangements might be acceptable, in
exceptional cases, for a limited period of time.18 With regard to the
application of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, the letter
stated that the prohibition of cartels relates to all private self-
restrictions which affect the German market. If in exceptional cases
self-restriction arrangements are considered necessary for overall
economic reasons, the Minister, after a hearing, will inform the
Federal Cartel Office which will then tolerate the arrangement. In
several cases the Federal Cartel Office opened proceedings against
Japanese self-restraint agreements and contacted Japanese authorities
within the framework of the 1967 OECD Recommendation Concern-
ing Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive Business
Practices Affecting International Trade. To date no official declara-
tions of tolerance, as provided for in the letter of the Minister for
Economic Affairs, have been issued.
17. A general analysis of the application of this provision is contained in Markert, The
Application of German Antitrust Law to International Restraints of Trade, 7 Va. J. Int'l L. 47
(1967), reprinted in 7A Economic Concentration, Hearings by the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 4091-102 (1969).
18. The text of this letter is published in Der Betriebsberater 1111 (1973).
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IV. CONDUCT CONTROL OF DOMINANT FIRMS
A. General Approach
Section 2219 empowers the Federal Cartel Office and the state
authorities to piohibit the "abusive exploitation" of a market dominat-
ing position. Section 22 defines such a position as one where a firm has
no competitors, is not exposed to substantial competition, or has an
"overriding" market position in relation to its competitors. These
definitions also apply to "shared" dominant market power of several
firms if factually no substantial competition exists between them.
Concert between the members of the group is not required. In addi-
tion, dominant market power is rebuttably presumed if a single firm
has a market share of one-third, or two or three firms together have a
market share of one-half, or four or five firms together have a market
share of two-thirds. These presumptions, however, do not apply to
smaller firms. The law does not define the term "abusive exploitation."
As interpreted by court and administrative practice, a dominant firm's
market conduct constitutes such an abuse if its conduct could not be
practiced under conditions of effective competition. 20
The range of possible abusive practices is usually divided into
exclusionary and hindering practices adversely affecting the competi-
tive freedom of other enterprises (e.g., exclusive dealing, refusal to sell,
discrimination, tie-in clauses) and exploiting practices (e.g., excessive
prices). The latter practices comprise the majority of cases brought
during the last year. Of 685 cases instituted since the enactment of the
1973 law through August 31, 1974, 293 involved abusive prices and
ninety-three involved abusive terms of sale. Cases against hindering
practices primarily involved refusals to sell (171).
In price abuse cases the yardstick of excessiveness is the price that
would prevail on the same market under conditions of effective
competition (the "as if competition" concept). Several methods are
available for this determination. If there is a comparable competitive
market (e.g., where separate geographic markets for the same product
exist), there is a presumption that the fictitious competition price in the
dominated market would not be higher than in the comparable com-
petitive market. If the price on the comparable market is lower, this
may also indicate excessiveness, unless the higher-priced market has
structural particularities that would also force competitive firms to
charge a higher price. Other indicators of excessiveness may also be:
(1) a price increase substantially exceeding cost increases, and (2)
profits of the dominant firm in the dominated market being higher in
19. 2 OECD 10.
20. For further details, see Barnikel, Abuse of Power by Dominant Firms: Application of the
German Law, 14 Antitrust Bull. 221, 231-40 (1969).
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relation to its profits in more competitive markets and the profits of
comparable firms in such markets.
B. Major Recent Cases of Price Control
The first major case in which the "fictitious competitive price"
concept was applied by the Federal Cartel Office arose in 1967 and
involved the large oil companies doing business in Germany. 2 1 After
the closing of the Suez Canal in June 1967, these companies had raised
their gasoline retail prices in several steps by 0,05 DM per liter. The
higher prices were maintained until the Fall of 1967, although the
supply situation had, in the interim, improved considerably and
transportation costs, claimed as justification for the high prices, had
dropped considerably. The Federal Cartel Office thereupon started
proceedings against the larger companies on the assumption that: (a)
due to the fact that they had for a long time followed a policy of
parallel conduct on the market, they were a dominant group within
the meaning of section 22(2); and, (b) the practice of a dominant firm
or group maintenance of prices although costs have gone down consid-
erably was an abusive practice within the meaning of section 22.
Public hearings were held in which Esso, Shell, BP and DEA (a
subsidiary of Texaco) appeared, and the Federal Cartel Office thereaf-
ter clearly indicated that an order would be issued. Esso then started
to lower its price by an average of about 0,02 DM per liter and the
others followed suit. The proceedings were thereupon terminated.
During the recent oil crisis the Federal Cartel Office again examined
the oil prices of the major sellers. In May 1974 preliminary orders were
issued against the German subsidiaries of BP and Texaco, prohibiting
an intended rise of gasoline prices by 0,01 to 0,02 DM per liter. Since
BP, unlike Texaco, did not drop its plan, a final order against it was
made two weeks later. However, a motion by BP to suspend the
immediate effect of the order was sustained by the Berlin Court of
Appeals. 22 The court expressed "serious" doubts as to whether the
Federal Cartel Office had presented sufficient evidence to establish a
dominant market position and an abuse. On the question of abuse, the
court said that the "very considerable" profit increases shown by the
parent company during 1973 gave rise to a "certain suspicion" that the
transfer prices paid by BP/Germany to the parent company were
excessive, but absent further inquiry this did not prove the abuse. In
this connection the court noted that the Federal Cartel Office had the
power to issue formal requests for information and documents directly
21. For further details of this case, see id. at 223-28.
22. Judgment of May 14, 1974, (1974) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 549.
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against the foreign parent company. The case was dropped in August
1974 after gasoline prices in Germany again began to decline.
Another important area where the Federal Cartel Office applied
section 22 to excessive prices is drugs. In a formal decision,2 3 Ernst
Merck, the leading seller of vitamin B12, was ordered to lower its
price by between 60 and 70 percent. It was found that prices of other
sellers in Germany and in Switzerland were substantially lower and
that Merck could maintain its prices only as a result of the irregular
conditions on the drug market. On appeal the Berlin Court of Appeals,
by a decision of March 19, 1975, affirmed in substance the order of the
Federal Cartel Office, but lowered the price reduction percentages
from 60-70 percent to about 50 percent.
A second case concerns the prices for "Valium" and "Librium"
which are distributed in Germany by the German subsidiary of the
Swiss firm Hoffman-LaRoche AG. The German subsidiary buys the
ingredient from the parent company at a transfer price which in the
case of Valium is ninety times higher than the market price in Italy
where no patent protection exists. Moreover, Hoffman-LaRoche/
Germany is a licensee of the Swiss parent and is paying substantial
license fees. As a result, the total transfer price paid for the ingredient
in the case of Valium is 130 times higher than the manufacturing costs.
Profits in this case are about 60 percent on turnover, compared, for
example, with two percent in the electrical industry. After a public
hearing the Federal Cartel Office ordered price reductions of 40
percent for Valium and of 35 percent for Librium. 24
Abuse control activity is also found in the automobile industry. In
the Fall of 1973 the Federal Cartel Office proceeded against VW to
prevent the intended introduction of a consignment system for the
distribution of VW and Audi-NSU cars. This step was regarded by the
Federal Cartel Office as a means of evading the statutory abolition of
resale price maintenance. VW, Ford/Germany and Opel (a subsidiary
of GM) together have a market share between 60 and 70 percent which
brings them under the market share presumptions. In May, 1974 the
Federal Cartel Office started proceedings against VW's automobile
prices, after they had been raised twice within two months amounting
to a total increase of more than ten percent. After an inspection of
VW's accounts and a public hearing, the Federal Cartel Office came to
the conclusion that the cost increases for labor, parts, energy and
transportation were even higher than the price increases so that it
could not be said with sufficient certainty that comparable firms in a
23. Decision of Mar. 21, 1974, (1974) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb.
24. Decision of Oct. 16, 1974 (not yet published). In a preliminary ruling the Berlin Court of
Appeals has stayed the execution of the order until its final decision.
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competitive market would not have effected the same price increase.
For this reason the case was dropped. 2 5
V. MERGER CONTROL
A. General Approach
The main features of the control system introduced by the 1973
law2 6 are:
(1) There is a compulsory notification system. As a rule, notification is required after
consummation, but large mergers involving at least two firms with annual sales of one
billion DM ($400 million) or more must be notified in advance and cannot be effected
before clearance has been given or a certain time has elapsed without intervention by
the Federal Cartel Office.
(2) The duty to notify and the Federal Cartel Office's power to contest apply only if
the mergers reach certain size and market dimensions. Mergers which do not reach
these dimensions are exempt, regardless of their effects on competition.
(3) The control procedure is divided into two stages. The first stage is the examination
by the Federal Cartel Office of the competitive effects of the merger measured in terms
of market domination. The second stage is the exemption procedure before the
Economics Minister for reasons of public interest.
(4) Decisions to prohibit mergers and to refuse an exemption are subject to full judicial
review.
27
The following points are of particular importance. Since the new
law uses market share and size criteria as requirements for notification
and control, it is important how affiliates are defined and whose
market shares and sales are included in the calculations of these
criteria in a particular case. In this respect the law contains special
rules which go beyond the traditional corporation law concepts of
affiliation. There is a special clause to the effect that a merger of firms
25. In February 1975 the Monopolies Commission, an independent advisory body to the
Federal Government, presented a general opinion on the "Application and Scope of the Abuse
Supervision over Market Dominating Enterprises since the Coming into Force of the Amendment
to the Cartel Act." While agreeing with the general position of the Federal Cartel Office that
prices may be controlled under section 22 and that costs may be examined in this context, the
Commission expressed the view that in applying section 22 priority should be given to actions
against exclusionary practices and "structural price abuses" (e.g., price discrimination) rather
than to control prices as such. Specifically, the Commission citicized the Federal Cartel Office
practice to control price increases on the basis of cost increases. To strengthen the "structural"
side of section 22 the Commission proposed that the law should be amended so as to empower the
Federal Cartel Office to prohibit any restrictive practice, whether or not otherwise legal, If In a
particular market the market share presumption of section 22(3) applies. In addition, tile
Commission proposed amendments to widen the scope of private antitrust action based on section
22.
26. Second Act Amending the Act Against Restraints of Competition, Law of Aug. 3, 1973,
[1973] BGBl. I 917.
27. A more detailed description of the system is given in Markert, The New German
Antitrust Reform Law, 19 Antitrust Bull. 135 (1974).
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having subsidiaries is regarded at the same time as a merger between
the subsidiaries themselves. As a result of this clause, mergers of
foreign companies having subsidiaries in Germany are at least partly
covered by German law. On this basis, the merger of the United States
firms Colgate and Helena Rubinstein, both of which have subsidiaries
in Germany, came within the scope of German merger law.28
The rule that mergers can be prohibited only if the annual sales of
the participating firms together are at least 500 million DM, and the
exclusion from control of the takeover of small firms with less than 50
million DM annual sales and of purely local mergers, represents a
policy decision by the legislature in favor of small business. The
underlying idea was that smaller firms should be free to perform the
necessary restructuring of their businesses. Further and perhaps more
convincing reasons were: (1) the intention to concentrate control regu-
lation on a reasonable number of major cases, rather than to deal with
great masses of petty cases, and (2) the experience that normally if the
size of firms is small, there is less likelihood that mergers of such firms
lead to monopoly power.
B. Enforcement Practices
As of December 31, 1974, 205 mergers had come within the scope of
the new control system and were investigated. Of the 205 cases, the
great majority involved acquisitions of equity and joint ventures,
while only ten percent involved other forms of merger. In eighty-four
of these cases, advance notifications were made (fifty-five mandatory
and twenty-nine voluntary). The remaining cases involved notifica-
tions of consummated mergers. Of the 205 cases, 115 were terminated
by giving clearance, four by withdrawal of the advance notification,
and five by prohibition orders. Eighty-one cases were still pending. Of
the five cases resulting in a prohibition order, one was exempted by the
Ministry for Economic Affairs, three are pending on appeal, and in the
fifth case the merger plan was dropped.
The first of the five cases in which the Federal Cartel Office
prohibited the merger involved Veba AG and Gelsenberg AG, both
companies having substantial activities in various sectors of the oil and
petrochemical industry. The merger was brought about by the Federal
Government, which already had a controlling influence in Veba AG
before the merger, when it acquired a majority of the equity of
Gelsenberg AG. The Federal Cartel Office, in prohibiting the merger,
pointed mainly to the substantial market shares of both firms for light
28. No order in this case was made since the firms did not reach or strengthen a market
dominating position in Germany
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and heavy fuel oil, for certain petrochemical products, for inland
navigation of oil and coal and for electricity. 29 The oligopolistic
structure of most of these markets was also an important factor. The
exemption decision is mainly based on considerations of energy policy.
It was said that a strong national oil company was "indispensable for
secured supplies of mineral oil products" and that such a company
would "improve the prospects of negotiations with oil producing
countries on quantities to be purchased and direct participation in
joint projects. '30 Another consideration was that both companies
together would only be medium-sized on a world-wide scale.
The second prohibition order concerned the proposed merger be-
tween two medium-sized paper manufacturing companies. 3' Both
companies together would have reached 90 percent of domestic news-
print production. Together with two importing firms, their domestic
market share would have been two-thirds. Allegations by the firms
that the strong position of the Scandinavian producers would endanger
the maintenance of a major paper producing company in Germany
were not accepted by the Federal Cartel Office.
The third case involved a joint venture of Veba/Gelsenberg,
Deutsche Fina and Occidental Oil GmbH for the joint selling of
liquid-asphalt products. 32 The four companies together had a 22
percent market share. The other major sellers are Shell (30 percent),
Esso (25 percent), BP (eight percent) and Texaco (eight percent). The
Federal Cartel Office reasoned that the merger would bring about a
tight oligopoly with the three largest sellers having a 77 percent market
share. Further, in view of the parallel price behavior of the sellers, the
merger would strengthen the already existing market dominating
position of the large sellers.
In the fourth case, the United States company Johnson & Johnson
had acquired a majority interest in Dr. Carl Hahn GmbH, the leading
German manufacturer of tampons with a domestic market share of
about 80 percent. In prohibiting this acquisition the Federal Cartel
Office reasoned that Dr. Carl Hahn GmbH already had a dominant
position in tampons before the merger and that, although Johnson &
Johnson did not sell tampons in Germany, this position was
strengthened by the merger. In this connection the considerable finan-
cial and technological resources of Johnson & Johnson, its advertising
29. Decision of Jan. 7, 1974, (1974) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 263.
30. Decision of Feb. 4, 1974, (1974) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 553. The order in this case
was not challenged by the parties; nor did they ask for an exemption.
31. Decision of Feb. 1, 1974, (1974) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 343.
32. Decision of May 29, 1974, (1974) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 791. The parties have
appealed to the Berlin Court of Appeals.
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potential and the fact that it offered a large range of hygienic and
cosmetic products were taken into account. These factors, in the
opinion of the Federal Cartel Office, amounted to substantial market
entry barriers deteriorating the competitive position of actual or poten-
tial competitors. Both firms have brought an appeal against the order
of the Federal Cartel Office.
The fifth case also involved a United States firm, the Kaiser
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. Kaiser and the German Preus-
sag AG are joint owners of the Kapal group which consists of several
joint ventures for the production and distribution of aluminum ingots
and other aluminum products. Under the merger plan notified to the
Federal Cartel Office, Preussag would sell its 50 percent interest in the
raw aluminum joint venture to Kaiser and the German firm Vereinigte
Aluminiumwerke AG (VAW). Kaiser's and Preussag's interests in the
other joint ventures would be transferred to VAW Leichtmetall
GmbH, a subsidiary of VAW, and Kaiser would acquire a 25 percent
interest in VAW Leichtmetall. VAW, a subsidiary of the state-owned
Vereinigte Industrie-Unternehmungen AG (Viag), is the largest domes-
tic producer and processor of aluminum. Taking into account the close
oligopolistic structure of the domestic market and Kaiser's position as
one of the largest producers in the world, the Federal Cartel Office
concluded that the merger would strengthen already existing market
dominating positions for aluminum ingots and several types of
semi-manufactured and aluminum finishes. The parties have asked the
Ministry for Economic Affairs for an exemption from the prohibition
order of the Federal Cartel Office.
The five prohibition orders do not show the total impact of the new
law. In one case a merger project was dropped entirely after the
Federal Cartel Office had informed the parties that it would veto it. In
several other cases of an announced veto, the mergers were ultimately
carried out in a different form (by acquisition of a 20 percent instead of
25 percent interest, by a merger with a smaller competitor, or by
reducing the number of participants in a joint venture). Undoubtedly
there are other cases where merger projects were dropped for antitrust
reasons even without any contacts with the Federal Cartel Office. As a
whole, the impact of the new system on the merger activity of firms
must be considered rather substantial.
VI. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
As a result of the 1973 reform law, the antitrust system in Germany
has come considerably closer to American antitrust law. German
antitrust law now covers almost all practices covered by United States
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antitrust law. Certainly, the exemption clauses for horizontal agree-
ments, licensing agreements and mergers, and the absence of decon-
centration powers similar to section 2 of the Sherman Act, make
German antitrust law still considerably less strict than its American
counterpart. On the other hand, German law is stricter in regard to
the market behavior of powerful firms including shared monopoly,
resale price maintenance and restrictive recommendations. It should
also be noted that as a result of EEC antitrust law, vertical territorial
restrictions within the Common Market are virtually per se illegal.
Similarly, public enforcement, both from a legal and practical point of
view, is comparable to United States practice as can be seen, for
example, from the conspiracy cases described above. Only private
enforcement is still rather undeveloped. Germany has no treble dam-
age action and "normal" antitrust damage suits are rare.
A further similarity is the wide coverage of international practices.
Section 98(2) of the German antitrust law33 covers all restraints of
trade which have effects on domestic territory. It is true that this wide
concept has not been applied as extensively as in some American
cases. 3 4 But German practice in this respect goes further than in most
other countries with active antitrust systems.
Antitrust in Germany also has more than a mere economic dimen-
sion. Its function-to protect freedom of economic activity and to
combat excessive business power-is seen as equally important. It is
true that competition is not given absolute priority over other policy
considerations. This is reflected by the various antitrust exemption
clauses and the absence of strict per se rules. But it is generally
accepted that competition should be traded off for other policy consid-
erations only as an exception. The general political trend is for
stronger antitrust policy, rather than diminishing its role. As a result,
antitrust considerations will become still more important in business
and political life.
33. 2 OECD 42.
34. See Markert, The Application of German Antitrust Law to International Restraints of
Trade, 7 Va. J. Int'l L. 47, 66-67 (1967). The application of German antitrust law to
multinational firms is described in more detail in K. Markert, Anti-Monopoly Legislation In
Europe, in Nationalism and the Multinational Enterprise 279-88 (H. Hahlo, J. Smith, R. Wright
ed. 1973).
